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1 Introduction
Violent internal conict plagues many states in the world. Counting all
countries and years since 1950, the average yearly prevalence of civil conict
is about 7%, with a peak of more than 12% in 1991 and 1992, according to
the Correlates of War (COW) data set. Figure 1a shows the variable time
trend in the worldwide prevalence of civil war. The cumulated death toll
of these conicts is now approaching 20 million people.1 It is of rst order
importance to understand the forces behind this source of human su¤ering.
The aims of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of the economic
and institutional determinants of conict, and to use this model to inter-
pret the evidence on the prevalence of civil conict across countries and its
incidence within countries over time. This exercise reects our belief that
is hard to investigate the causes of civil war empirically without beginning
from an explicit theory. We view the paper as a rst step along an iterative
path where development of theory and empirical work in this area are joined
together. In both the theoretical and empirical sphere, we are fortunate in
being able to build on a number of prior contributions.
Classic theoretical models of conict, such as those suggested by Gross-
man (1991) and Skaperdas (1992), have been applied to understanding civil
war. In common with the model developed here, these authors see conict as
the outcome of an equilibrium process in which the incentives of the various
parties are modeled explicitly. Those incentives arise from the technology
of conict, the preferences of the protagonists, and the underlying economic
constraints. Much progress has been made on this basis. However, most of the
theoretical work has been pursued separately from the empirical literature
and the models have not generally been formulated with empirical testing in
mind.2
The model in this paper begins with a government faced by an opposition
that can mount an insurgency aimed at overthrowing the government. While
not every incidence of civil war is of this form, many cases are (see Fearon
(2007) for discussion). Three mechanisms are key to understanding when an
insurgency breaks out. The rst is the opportunity cost of ghting: when in-
comes are higher, the cost of insurgency is higher, as is the cost of defending
against it, simply because the recruiting of ghters is more expensive. This
1See Lacina and Gledtisch (2005).
2Fearon (2007) is an exception. However, he follows a rather di¤erent modeling ap-
proach to that adopted here.
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mechanism is central to earlier models such as Grossman (1991). The second
mechanism concerns the nature of the prize that is won by holding o¢ ce
and how this will be distributed given institutional constraints. Better such
constraints can limit conict by reducing the incentive to capture the gov-
ernment, whereas larger natural resource rents appropriable by government
increase the gain from ghting. The third mechanism concerns the technol-
ogy for ghting and the likely allocation of political power in the absence of
an insurgency. The models equilibrium provides a simple characterization
of how these three factors interact in determining whether conict occurs.
In recent years, a large empirical literature has emerged, which looks at
conict and its determinants.3 A robust nding in this literature is that
poor countries are disproportionately involved in civil war, even though the
direction of causation may be di¢ cult to establish. The concentration in poor
countries is shown in Figure 1b, which plots the country-wise incidence of
civil war since 1950 (or independence, if later) against GDP per capita in
the year 2000. But the interpretation of this correlation is open to debate.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) see it as reecting limited state capacity to put
down rebellions, while Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) see it as a reection of the
lower opportunity cost of ghting when incomes are low.
There is also considerable debate about other prospective drivers of civil
war, such as ethnic divisions and political institutions. When it comes to
natural resources, results diverge as well. While some authors have found
natural resources to signicantly raise the probability of onset and/or du-
ration of civil war, other researchers have failed to nd such an e¤ect (see
Ross, 2004 for a review of the research on this topic). Most of these studies
measure the inuence of natural resources by the between-country variation
in measures such as primary exports over GDP, however, which makes it
hard to rule out alternative interpretations of the ndings in terms of reverse
causation or omitted variables.4
A small emerging literature studies variation in conict within countries.
For example, Deininger (2003) uses community level data from Uganda nd-
ing that scarcity of economic opportunities (proxied by infrastructure) and
3See Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) and Blattman and Miguel (2008) for reviews.
4Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use weather shocks to instrument for income
in African countries from the 1980s and onwards, and nd that lower income raises the
probability of civil conict. Related to the approach in this paper, Bruckner and Ciccone
(2007) show that an export price index also predicts growth and that the relationship
between growth and civil war is heterogeneous across democracies and non-democracies.
3
the presence of cash crops are correlated with the civil strife. Most related to
this paper is Dube and Vargas (2008), who exploit variation in co¤ee and oil
prices to model the incidence of conict within Colombian municipalities.
The main empirical contribution of the paper is to look at the incidence
of conict, controlling for unobserved causes behind the uneven incidence of
civil war across countries and time by xed country e¤ects and xed year
e¤ects. We show that country-specic price indexes constructed for agricul-
tural products, minerals and oils (using 1980 as a base year) have consider-
able explanatory power in predicting the within-country variation of conict.
Specically, higher prices of exported commodities raise the probability of
observing conict in terms of our model, such prices hikes raise the gain
from holding power by boosting natural resource rents. Higher prices of im-
ported commodities also raise the probability of civil war in terms of our
model, higher prices of imported inputs reduce wages, and hence the cost of
conict, by reducing the demand for labor (on top of this, lower wages also
raise resource rents).
The fact that we identify these e¤ects from time variation in world market
prices for commodities makes it implausible to argue that long-run aspects
of political, economic, cultural or social structure are driving the results. We
also show that the e¤ects of commodity prices are heterogeneous across po-
litical institutions, in a way that is consistent with the theory. In particular,
the international price e¤ects are only present where political institutions
are weak, but absent (or opposite in sign) where political institutions are
strong.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
develops our model. Section 3 discusses some preliminaries needed to go
from model to empirical implementation, while Section 4 describes the data
used in our empirical work. Section 5 discusses the empirical results in two
parts: we rst look entirely at cross-sectional di¤erences, and then move
along to longitudinal results exploiting within-country variation. Section 6
concludes.
2 Basic Model
Our aim is to build a model that is simple and tractable and, at the same
time, serves as a useful guide for how observable economic and political
factors determine the probability of violent domestic conict.
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Models that generate conict as an equilibrium outcome rely on either
imperfect information or inability of the parties to commit to (post-conict)
strategies. The key friction in our model is of the second type: the inability
of any prospective government to credibly o¤er post-conict transfers, and
the inability of potential insurgents to commit not to use their capacity to
engage in conict.
There are two groups: A and B. Each group makes up one half of the
population. Time is innite and denoted by t = 1; :::; although we will drop
the time index in much of the theoretical section. One generation is alive at
each date and is labelled according to the date at which it lives. There are
no state variables in the model. The dynamics come from two stochastic
variables the value of public goods and natural resources whose values are
determined afresh each period. At the beginning of each period, members
of the group that held power at the end of the previous period inherit a hold
on the incumbent government, denoted by I 2 fA;Bg : The other group
makes up the opposition, denoted by O 2 fA;Bg. The incumbent group can
mount an army, denoted by LI , and nanced out of the public purse. Power
can be transferred by peaceful means, but the opposition can also mount an
insurgency with armed forces LO and try to take over the government. The
winner of armed conict becomes the new incumbent and the loser the new
opposition, denoted by I 0 2 fA;Bg and O0 2 fA;Bg :
The new incumbent gets access to existing government revenue, from
taxes and natural resources, which is denoted by R: The revenue is divided
between spending on general public goods G and transfers to the incum-
bent T I
0
and the opposition TO
0
. Revenues are stochastic and drawn afresh
each period from a known distribution function D (R) on nite support
R 2 [RL; RH ] : The precise timing of these di¤erent events/decisions are
spelled out below.
Individual incomes and utility Individuals supply labor in a common
labor market to earn an exogenous wage w:We assume that individuals have
utility functions
H (Gs) + c
J , (1)
where cJ is private consumption by group J 2 fI 0; O0g and Gs is the level
of public goods provided, with the parameter  reecting the value of public
goods. The function H () is increasing and concave and  is distributed
identically and independently over time on nite support [L; H ] :
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The government budget constraint in any period can be written
R 
X
J2fI0;O0g
T J
2
 G  wLI  0 , (2)
where LI denotes the size of the army chosen by the incumbent.
Institutions Asmentioned above, power can be transferred between groups
according to democratic principles, or by a violent conict in which each
group raises armed forces LJ to ght. The probability that group O wins
power and becomes the new incumbent I 0 is

 
LO; LI

, (3)
which depends on the resources devoted to ghting function  is increas-
ing in its rst argument and decreasing in the second. In this formula-
tion,  (0; 0) is the probability of a peaceful transition of power between the
groups.5 Below we make a specic assumption on the functional form of (3).
Each group (when in opposition) has the power to tax/conscript its own
citizens to nance a private militia in order to mount an insurgency. We
denote this capacity by  so LOs 1   which is common to the two groups
so that neither has a greater intrinsic capability to ght. This formulation
sweeps aside the interesting issue of how it is that an opposition can solve
the collective action problem in organizing violence.
Political institutions are assumed to constrain the possibilities for incum-
bents to make transfers to their own group. To capture this as simply as
possible, assume that a politician must give  2 [0; 1] to the the opposi-
tion group, when it makes a transfer of 1 to its own group implying that
TO
0
= T I
0
. Given this assumption, we use the government budget con-
straint (assuming that it holds with equality) to obtain:
T I
0
= 2 (1  ) R G  wLI , (4)
where  = 
1+
2 [0; 1=2]. Throughout, we interpret a higher value of the
oppositions share of transfers, ; as reecting more representative, or consen-
sual, political institutions. The real-world counterparts of a high  may be
5This follows the symmetry of the model in giving neither of the groups an intrinsic
advantage of gaining power peacfully. But the model could be extended to allow for this.
However, the model does allow for a pro-incumbent bias, when  (0; 0) < 1=2, perhaps due
to party recognition or media control: .
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a more proportional electoral system, or more minority protection through a
system of constitutional checks and balances. If  = 1=2, then transfers are
shared equally across the two groups.
Timing The following timing applies to each generation t:
1. The value of public goods  and natural resource rents R are realized.
2. Group O chooses the level of any insurgency LO.
3. The incumbent government chooses the size of its army LI :
4. Group I remains in o¢ ce with probability 1    LI ; LO :
5. The winning group becomes the new incumbent I 0 and determines poli-
cies, i.e., spending on transfers

T J
	
J2fI0;O0g and public goods G.
6. Payo¤s are realized, consumption takes place, and the currently alive
generation dies.
We next solve the model by working backwards to derive a sub-game perfect
equilibrium.
Equilibrium Policies Suppose now that we have a new incumbent deter-
mined at stage 4 above. Then, using (4), the optimal level of public goods
is determined as:
G = argmax
G0

H (G) + 2 (1  ) R G  wLI+ w	 : (5)
Dene bG (z) by
HG
 bG (z) = 1
z
:
We record the policy solution as:
Lemma 1 For given R and , public goods are provided as:
G = min
bG 
2 (1  )

; R  wLI

:
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There are two cases. If  is large enough and/or R small enough, all public
spending goes on public goods with any incremental revenues also spent on
public goods. Otherwise, the optimal level of public goods is interior and
increasing in  and . Intuitively, transfers to the incumbents own group
become more expensive as  increases. In the special case when  = 1=2 , we
get the same amount of spending on public goods as the amount that would
be chosen by a Utilitarian planner, namely bG(). With an interior solution for
G, any residual revenue is spent on transfers which are distributed according
to the -sharing rule.
The Strategy of Conict We now study the process of conict looking
for an equilibrium in which the opposition rst decides whether to mount
an insurgency and then the incumbent government chooses how to respond.
As we show below, the equilibrium has three possible regimes. In the rst,
no resources are committed to conict by either side, i.e. peace prevails. In
the second, there is no insurgency, but the government uses armed forces to
repress the opposition and increase its chances of remaining in power. In the
third case, there is outright conict where both sides are committing military
resources to a civil war.
Using the results in the last subsection, it is easy to check that the ex-
pected payo¤ of the incumbent is:
V^ I
 
;R;LO; LI

= H (G) + w (6)
+[(1  )    LO; LI (1  2)]2 R G  wLI .
The key term is [(1  )     LO; LI (1  2)] > 1=2, which is the weight
the incumbent attaches to end-of period transfers. This includes the aver-
age share of the incumbent, (1  ) ; given the institutional restriction on
transfers, as well as (minus) the probability that the opposition takes over
times the "extra" share (1  2) the policy-making incumbent captures of
the redistributive pie.
For the opposition group, we have
V^ O
 
;R;LO; LI

= H (G) + w
 
1  LO (7)
+[ + 
 
LO; LI

(1  2)]2 R G  wLI ;
where [ + 
 
LO; LI

(1  2)]  1=2 is the oppositions expected weight on
transfers.
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These payo¤ functions expose a key asymmetry in the model between the
incumbent and opposition in terms of nancing the army. The incumbents
army is publicly nanced and increasing the size of it reduces future transfers.
For the opposition, any insurgency must be nanced out of the groups own
private labor endowment given the power to tax its own citizens.
The two payo¤ functions also express the basic trade-o¤ facing the two
parties. On the one hand, higher armed forces have an opportunity cost.
On the other hand, for given armed forces of the other party, they raise
the probability of capturing or maintaining power and take advantage of the
monopoly on allocating government revenue. To study the resolution of these
countervailing incentives, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1
(a) The technology for conict is: 
 
LO; LI

= 

LO   LI+ O
(b)   1
(c)   O  1   .
Part (a) assumes that a linear probability model governs the outcome
of conict. This particular conict function is chosen mainly for analytic
tractability specically, it gives a simple closed-form solution to the conict
stage of the model.6 Part (b) says that the government has an advantage
in ghting. Restriction (c) on parameters guarantees that the probability of
turnover stays strictly between 0 and 1; and will hold if  is small enough.
Under these assumptions, we get a straightforward characterization of conict
regimes in terms of the size of the public revenues. This will enable us to
generate specic predictions to take to the data.
To solve for the equilibrium level of conict, dene Z = R   G as the
level of uncommittedgovernment revenues, i.e., the maximal redistributive
pie, the amount that can be spent on transfers (given equilibrium public-
goods provision). The equilibrium can then be described in terms of two
threshold values for Z which describe the size of the redistributive cake above
which the incumbent and opposition nd it worthwhile to expend positive
6The linear conict model is also exploited in Azam (2005). This is di¤erent from the
standard model from the literature which would be:

 
LO; LI

=
O + LO
LO + LI
:
Many of qualitative predictions would still hold for this model.
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resources to ghting. Specically, we have:
ZI =
w
 (1  2)

1     O (1  2)


(8)
and
ZO =
w
 (1  2)

1 +
 + O (1  2)


: (9)
It is straightforward to check that Assumption 1(b) implies ZO > ZI . Note
that both threshold values are increasing in the level of wage income.
Under Assumption 1, we have the following result (which is proved in the
Appendix):
Lemma 2 There are three possible regimes:
1. If Z < ZI , the outcome is peaceful with bLO = bLI = 0.
2. If Z 2 ZI ; ZO, there is no insurgency bLO = 0, but the incumbent
government chooses armed forces to repress the opposition such that:
bLI = 1
2
(Z   ZI)
w
:
3. If Z > ZO, there is civil war where the opposition mounts armed forces
bLO =   Z   ZO
w
;
and the government chooses an army:
bLI = 1
w

Z   Z
O + ZI
2

:
The Lemma describes three cases. When Z is below ZI , no conict erupts
as both the incumbent and the opposition accept the (probabilistic) peaceful
allocation of power, where the opposition takes over with probability O.
For Z 2 ZI ; ZO, the government invests in armed forces to increase its
survival probability, but the opposition does not invest in conict. Finally,
when Z > ZO, the opposition mounts an insurgency, which is met with force
by the government.
Two sources of government advantage lie behind these results. On the one
hand, the government can fund its army out of public revenues. On the other
hand, we have assumed that   1, which reects a comparative advantage
of government forces.
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Equilibrium implications It is straightforward to compute the equilib-
rium probability that the opposition wins o¢ ce as:
 ^O (Z) =
8<:
O Z  ZI
O   
2w

Z   ZI Z 2 ZI ; ZO
O   
2w

ZO   ZI Z  ZO :
As Z increases, the probability of the incumbent losing o¢ ce diminishes when
the government represses the opposition. However, once a civil war breaks
out, additional increases in Z do not change the expected outcome of the
conict even though both groups commit more resources to ghting.
The result in Lemma 2 also allows us to derive the size of the transfers
received by the winning group as a function of the level of tax revenues. To
this end, dene
T^ (Z) =
8><>:
Z Z  ZI
[Z+ZI]
2
Z 2 ZI ; ZO
[ZO+ZI]
2
Z  ZO :
as the net revenue function. Equilibrium transfers are thus:
T I
0
= (1  ) 2T^ (Z) and TO0 = 2T^ (Z) .
While the transfers are weakly monotonic in Z, it is easy to see that under
civil war (where Z  ZO), there is super crowding out of additional public
revenue. The incumbent governments marginal propensity to spend on the
army out of additional resources is unity, while the opposition continues
to spend more of its resources on its insurgency in an e¤ort to capture the
government. This implies that additional resources above ZO lead to a Pareto
inferior outcome.7
To unpack the implications of the model for the incidence of conict, it
is necessary to understand what determines the distribution of Z and the
threshold values given by (8) and (9), in particular the way in which they
depend upon the parameters of the model. Such knowledge will allow us to
match the predictions of the model to the cross-sectional and longitudinal
patterns in the data.
7 Observe also that our model does not deliver the paradox of power result from
Hirschleifer (1991). Because of the symmetry in the model, none of the parties has a
systematically weaker incentive to invest in an army. This would not be true in a model
like the one in Besley and Persson (2008b), where the incumbent internalizes the preference
of the opposition more or less depending on political institutions.
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3 From Theory to Evidence
In this section, we discuss how our proposed theory can inform empirical
studies of the incidence of civil war. Although the model is extremely simple,
it gives a transparent set of predictions on how parameters of the economy
and the polity a¤ect the incidence and severity of conict. A clear advantage
of beginning from the theory is that it gives us an explicit framework, in which
we can discuss which parameters are country specic and time specic, which
are observable, and which are unobservable.
We begin by dening the level of equilibriumnon-committed govern-
ment revenue for country c at date t as:
Zc;t (c;t; Rc;t; c) = Rc;t   G^

c;t
2 (1  c)

: (10)
The two main stochastic variables in the model that drive the within-country
variation in conict are c;t and Rc;t.
The incidence of conict in country c at date t is then characterized by
the probability that:
Zc;t (c;t; Rc;t; c) > Z
O
c;t =  
 
c; c; c; 
O
c

wc;t =  cwc;t , (11)
where the country-specic multiplier of the wage is a function  () dened
by
 
 
; ; ; O

=
 + 
 (1  2) +
O

.
Condition (11) illustrates the basic trade-o¤ mentioned above between the
opportunity cost of ghting and the probability of winning the redistributive
cake.
We also note that in a richer model, where the government raised some
of its revenue by taxing wage income, the critical condition could be written
in terms of the ratio between Rc;t and wc;t; and would thus involve the share
of resource rents in total income (see Besley and Persson, 2008b).8
To operationalize an empirical model based on (11), three issues must
be dealt with. First, one has to make decisions on measurement of the key
parameters. Second, it is necessary to take a stance on what is xed (at the
country level) and what is time varying. Third, one needs to specify what is
8See also Aslaksen and Torvik (2006) for a model along these lines.
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plausibly exogenous and what is endogenous to the process generating civil
conict.
Beginning with measurement, decent empirical proxies can be found for
wc;t; Rc;t, and c. There are readily observable sources of data on whether
a country is in civil war, but we have no clear-cut indicator for whether it
is in a repression regime. Hence, we follow earlier literature in focusing on
modeling the probability of civil war. The other determinants of civil war
are unobservable (or very hard to measure). Among these unobservables, we
treat the conict technology parameters c; c and 
O
c as xed, but allow the
demand for general interest public goods s to vary over time, as it does in
the model. In all cases, these unobservables become part of the error process
assumed to generate the data.
Moving further towards empirical specication, consider country c at date
t: By (10), we can let "c;t = bG( c;t2(1 c)) denote the randomness in Zc;t induced
by uctuations in the demand for public goods. Now, "c;t will have a c.d.f.
Xc(" Ac) on the nite support [ bG( L2(1 c)); bG( H2(1 c))] where Ac is the coun-
try specic mean of "c;t. Using conditions (10) and (11), we can dene the
conditional probability that a researcher observes conict in country c at date
s as
Xc(Rc;t    
 
c;c; c; 
O
c

wc;t   Ac) : (12)
It follows that an increase in Rc;t or a decrease in wc;t in a given period t raises
the probability of observing civil war, unless  is not to close to its maximum
value: The reason for the qualication is that when  ! 1
2
;  !1: Because
Rc;t has nite support, Rc;t    
 
c;c; c; 
O
c

wc;t < 0; which is below the
support of "c;t: By continuity, Xc is thus increasing in Rc;t and decreasing in
wc;t only as long as c is below some upper bound c < 12 :
In similar vein, we can also consider the intensity of conict, which we
take to be a monotonic function of the total amount of resources devoted to
ghting conditional on being in conict, and is given by:
wc;t
 
LOc;t + L
I
c;t

=
" 
Zc;t   ZOc;t

c + Zc;t  
ZOc;t + Z
I
c;t
2
#
: (13)
This too depends on the underlying institutional determinants and economic
conditions. In particular, intensity of conict increases monotonically in Zc;t:
We also note that changes in most of these parameters do not give us un-
ambiguous predictions about the probability of observing repression (without
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further assumptions). For instance, an increase in wc;t or c drives up both
the lower bound ZI and the upper bound ZO for the repression regime, such
that the probability of observing a repression equilibrium can go either way,
depending on the form of the distribution Xc: For this reason, we do not
try to investigate the incidence of repression in the empirical section of this
paper. Still, the possibility of a repression equilibrium is an interesting im-
plication of our model and, at the same time, repressive political regimes
appear to be an important empirical phenomenon, especially in poor and
weakly institutionalized countries. This aspect of the model is taken up in
Besley and Persson (2009).
Based on the insights from this section, we study the empirical determi-
nants of civil war in two steps. We begin (in Section 4) by considering what
can be learned solely from between-country variation, looking at cross-section
evidence on the prevalence of conict across countries. Then (in Section 5),
we look at within country-variation which only exploits the variation of con-
ict over time. In this second step, we will also esh out the economic model
to make explicit which role commodity-price uctuations might play in af-
fecting civil war.
4 Between-Country Variation
In this section, we discuss the variation of civil war across countries. We begin
with some preliminaries, spell out the relevant predictions of our model, and
briey discuss econometric specication. After a presentation of the data,
we present the results of some cross-sectional regressions.
Preliminaries Consider the cross-sectional implications implied by the av-
erage value of (12) over some portion of each countrys history. The average
incidence of civil war in our model can be derived from the unconditional
probability of observing conict in country c; viz.
EfXc(Rc;t    
 
c;c; c; 
O
c

wc;t   Ac);Rc; wcg , (14)
where Rc is the country-specic mean of resource rents Rc;t and wc is the
country-specic mean of wages.wc;t. The model gives a series of predictions
about how changes in parameters a¤ects the cross-country pattern of conict.
In a panel of countries of length T , the unconditional probability of civil
war converges to the sample average in country c of a binary civil war indi-
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cator (which takes a value of 1 when the country is in civil war and a value
of 0 otherwise), as T ! 1: The data points in Figure 1b display precisely
such sample averages.
Predictions We collect the predictions from our model about the uncon-
ditional probability of civil war in the following proposition.
Proposition 1
(a) An increase the average value of general public goods expenditures Ac
reduces the cross-sectional incidence of conict.
(b) An increase in average wages wc reduces the incidence of conict.
(c) More consensual political institutions, an increase in the value of c;
reduce the cross-sectional incidence of conict.
(d) An increase in the average level of natural resource rents Rc increases
the cross-sectional incidence of conict.
To understand prediction (a) in terms of the theory, observe that an increase
in c;t, reduces Z(c;t; Rt; ) because bG () is an increasing function. In fact,
for large enough c;t, we have Z (c;t; Rc;t; ) = 0; which guarantees a peaceful
outcome. By reducing the conict over redistributive transfers, demand for
public goods also reduces conict over the state. This nding is quite di¢ cult
to test in the data. However, one crude fact in support of this nding is that
there is a strong negative correlation in the data between the incidence of
external wars and civil conict.9
To see where (b) comes from, note that by (11) an increase in wc;t raises
the critical bound ZOc;t for civil war. Intuitively, higher real incomes raises the
opportunity cost of raising an army and hence reduces the likelihood that
the opposition (and the incumbent) will wish to ght. It also reduces the
intensity of conict, since both groups nd it more costly to ght when the
opportunity cost is higher.
The prediction in (c) arises through several channels. More consensual
institutions increase spending on public goods via the function bG () and
thereby decreases the size of the redistributive cake. They also raise the
9Of the total country-years in our panel data set, only a share 0.0018 have simultaneous
extranal and internal conict.
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lower bound for conict as  
 
; ; ; O

is increasing in : This captures the
fact that consensual institutions reduce the value of holding power since the
incumbent now captures a smaller share of the redistributive cake. The total
resources expended on conict are also lower when institutions improve.
Finally, the prediction in (d) about the impact of government revenue
triggered by higher natural resource rents works by increasing Zc;t and hence
the likelihood that Rc;t lies above the conict threshold. For a given opportu-
nity cost of armed forces, the redistributive prize of winning becomes higher.
It also clear from (13) that, as Zc;t goes up, so do the resources devoted to
conict.
Econometric specication Now let civc;t be a dummy variable denoting
whether country c is in civil conict at date t. Then in a cross-sectional
setting we can average this variable over some time period and then run
regressions of the form:
civc = a+ byc + c ,
where yc is a vector including measures of average wages and resource rents,
wc and Rc; and political institutions 
c. We discuss in greater detail below
how to nd proxies for these variables.
Note, however, that this procedure entails a di¢ cult identication prob-
lem. To obtain unbiased estimates of vector b; the parameters of interest, we
have to assume that the the country specic vector yc is uncorrelated with
the country-specic error term c and thus with unobserved determinants
of conict, such as c; c; c; 
O
c ; Ac in the model. This is a restrictive and
implausible assumption. For example, the same forces that lead to a high
level of income wc are likely to lead to a high value of public goods Ac in the
model. This would thus result in a positive correlation between wc and c
and biased estimates of parameters of interest.
Data We explore the incidence of civil war in a panel data set where each
observation is a country year for the period 1960-2005, subject to data avail-
ability.
Di¤erent data sources have been used in the empirical literature to iden-
tify the incidence of civil conict.10 One of our main dependent variables is
10There are a number of issues involved in the coding of conicts into civil wars. See
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whether a given country has a civil war in a given year. This indicator vari-
able is obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) data set, which provides
annual data on conicts (from 1816) up to 1997. The COW intrastatewar
indicator takes a value of 1 if a given country in a given year is involved in
a violent conict which claims a (cumulated) death toll of more than 1000
people. Because our theory is developed to shed light on a purely domestic
conict, we only include conicts between a countrys government and a do-
mestic insurgent, and remove conicts that involve interventions by another
state. For the same reason, we neither include any so-called extra-systemic
wars.
Another commonly used civil-war indicator is compiled by the peace re-
search institutes in Uppsala (UCDP) and Oslo (PRIO). Their data set goes
up to 2005, and also includes detailed data on the number of battle deaths
in each conict, which can be used as a proxy for the intensity of conict.
There are some di¤erences in the classications of wars between the two data
sets the correlation at the country-year level is 0.73. Of the 5279 possible
country-year pairs in our period where both data sets are available, there
is disagreement in only 292 cases in 43 of these the COW data classies
a country as being in conict when UCDP/PRIO does not; the opposite is
true in 259 country-year observations (the larger number of mismatches in
this direction largely reects that UCDP/PRIO include conicts with foreign
intervention). For example, Turkey is classied as being in conict between
1984 and 1990 by the UCDP/PRIO data, but not by the COW data. On
the other hand, Thailand is viewed as being in conict between 1970 an 1973
by COW, but not by UCDP/PRIO. While we check the robustness of our
results to using both classications of conict, our main results are based on
the COW data.
The means of the main cross-sectional variables are given in Table 1.
The table displays summary statistics for three classications. In the rst
column, we look at the means (standard deviations in brackets) for all 124
countries for which the main variables are available between 1960 and 2000.
We then disaggregate into the 39 countries that have had a civil conict
over this period and those that have not. This gives us a feel for how these
two groups vary. Table 1 shows that the overall incidence of conict during
this period is 8%. However, among the countries with any conict, 27% of
Sambanis (2004) for a thorough discussion about di¤erent denitions that appear in the
empirical literature.
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the country-year observations are in conict. A more continuous measure of
civil conict uses battle deaths.11 However, this is available only for a more
limited sample of countries. Unsurprisingly, given the 1000-death threshold,
average battle deaths in the non-conict sample is a tenth of the level among
the conict countries.
Considering background characteristics of countries, the level of income
per capita (from the Maddison data set) is higher among non-conict states
(around three times higher). States having experienced civil wars are also
more likely to be oil dependent, with more than 10% of their GDP being
generated by oil exports according to the NBER-UN trade data set. The same
broad pattern is found when we consider primary products more generally,
including minerals and agricultural products.
Table 1 also shows that around 37% of conict states are democracies,
as measured by having a polity2 variable in the Polity IV data set exceeding
zero, compared to 49% of non-conict states. We also measure parliamentary
democracy by a dummy variable. This is set equal to 1 if the country is
democratic according to the polity2 denition and, at the same time, has a
parliamentary form of government (dened as a condence requirement of the
executive vs. the legislature, as in Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Only 15% of
country-year observations in conict states are in parliamentary democracies,
as against 28% of those in the non-conict state sample. We also construct a
measure of high constraints on the executive, exploiting the xconst variable
in Polity IV data. This latter variable takes on integer values from 1 to 7 and
captures various checks and balances on the executive. We set our indicator
equal to 1, when xconst takes on its maximum value of 7, and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 shows that 31% of country-year observations have high executive
constraints among states that did not have a civil war, compared to only
12% among those that did.
Results We now consider some basic cross-sectional patterns in the inci-
dence of civil war. These parallel the ndings that have been discussed in the
previous literature. However, it is useful to anchor these cross-sectional facts
and to assess their robustness in the context of our model.
To this end, Table 2 presents results from a few cross-sectional regressions.
Our basic specication uses the prevalence of conict (the average number
of years in which a specic country has been in conict between 1960 and
11See http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conict/Battle-Deaths/
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1997) as our dependent variable. All specications include the log of GDP
per capita as a right hand side variable. This serves as a proxy for the
average value of the wage for country c; wc. In column (1), we nd that
richer countries are less likely to be involved in conict than poorer ones
a basic nding of the literature. We also include a dummy variable for
whether a country is democratic. Somewhat surprisingly, this turns out to
be positively correlated with the prevalence of civil war. This suggests either
that democracy is correlated with unobservables in the cross-section, that
democracy is a poor proxy for consensual institutions as measured by c; or
that the correlation between democracy and civil war is more subtle and not
well captured by a linear model.12 Turning to economic structure, we nd
no evidence, in the cross section, that large oil exporters are more often in
civil conict. However, large (non-oil) primary goods exporters are, ceteris
paribus, less likely to be involved in a civil conict. While these results are
all interesting, it is quite di¢ cult to interpret them in terms of the theory
outlined above.
In column (2), we repeat the specication from column (1) including a
dummy variable capturing whether the country is a parliamentary democ-
racy. Arguably, this is a better proxy for c. While this variable is negatively
correlated with civil-war prevalence, the correlation is not statistically signif-
icant. In column (3), we include an interaction term between parliamentary
democracy and whether a country is a large oil or primary products producer.
Here, there is some evidence that civil war is more prevalent among large oil
producers that are not parliamentary democracies.13
While these results are interesting and serve to breath some life into the
predictions of the model, the results in Table 2 cannot be given a causal
interpretation. The main problem is the likelihood of biases due to unob-
served heterogeneity across countries discussed at the end of the econometric
specication. Many of our right-hand side variables are likely to be corre-
lated with unobservable features of countries such as culture, institutions
and history. Moreover, as has been widely recognized in previous work, us-
ing purely cross-sectional data throws away important information about the
factors that shape the timing of the onset of civil war and its duration once
it begins.
12For the latter possibility, see Collier and Rohner (2008).
13Although a closer look at the data suggests that this is basically a Trinidad and Tobago
e¤ect.
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5 Within-Country Variation
In an e¤ort to deal with the many unobserved determinants of civil war, we
now turn to the within-country variation in the data. It is of particular inter-
est to use time variation in wc;t and Rc;t to explain the time-varying incidence
of civil conict. To isolate plausibly exogenous variation in these two vari-
ables, we exploit the time variation in import and export prices determined
in world markets.14 We therefore begin this section by developing a simple
micro-founded model to illustrate how prices of importable and exportable
commodities a¤ect wages and natural resources rents, and hence the inci-
dence of civil war over time. We then discuss the econometric specication
and the additional data that we use before presenting the main empirical
results.
A simple two sector trade model To motivate the role of commodity
prices in determining conict, suppose that a small open economy produces
a primary export product, the price of which in period t; pt is determined in
a global market and is exogenous at the country level. This export good is
produced using a xed factor kc which varies by country and can be thought
of as land, mines, or oil wells (measured in e¢ ciency units). Since we are
interested in the short-run e¤ect of raw materials prices, we assume that the
production function has xed coe¢ cients, i.e.:
Y xc;t = min

lxc;t; kc
	
,
where lxc;t is the quantity of labor used in producing the export good in
country c in year t. As long as pt > wc;t, then lxc;t = kc; and
Rc;t = kc (pt   wc;t)
are the rents earned on the xed factor which we assume accrue to govern-
ment as in the model above.
Another sector produces a (tradeable or non-tradeable) consumption good
from labor and an imported raw material, which is denoted by mc;t with
(given) price qt also determined at the global level: The price of the good
produced in this second sector is set equal to one (i.e., we let it be the
numeraire). Production in this sector also uses xed coe¢ cients so that:
Y mc;t = min

cl
m
c;t;mc;t
	
:
14This implicitly assumes that each country is small relative to world markets.
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We assume that:
c < kc < 1 and c (1  qt) < pt ,
which guarantee that both sectors produce.
The equilibrium demand for raw material inputs is:
mc;t = cl
m
c;t = c(1  lxc;t) = c [1  kc] :
We assume that production in the importables sector is competitive and,
because of constant returns, leads to zero prots. The equilibrium wage is
then determined from
[1  kc] [c (1  qt)  wc;t] = 0 ;
or
wc;t = c (1  qt) :
In this case:
@wc;t
@qt
=  c ,
i.e., the wage is decreasing in the price of importable raw materials.
Predictions Using this simple model, we get the following prediction on
the impact of prices of primary products on the incidence of civil war.
Proposition 2
The likelihood of observing civil war is increasing in raw material import
prices, qt and export prices pt; provided that the inclusiveness of political
institutions c fall below some upper bound c.
By (12) we want to investigate the impact of commodity prices on Zc;t ZOc;t.
Now observe that:
d(Zc;t   ZOc;t)
dpt
=
dRc;t
dpt
= kc > 0 :
A higher price of exported commodities thus raises the probability of observ-
ing conict, since the latter is increasing in Zc;t   ZOc;t: For changes in the
price of imported raw materials, we have:
d(Zc;t   ZOc;t)
dqt
=
 
dRc;t
dwc;t
  dZ
O
c;t
dwc;t
!
dwc;t
dqt
= c(kc +  c) > 0 :
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Intuitively, a higher price of the imported rawmaterial lowers the wage, which
raises rents in the export sector and, hence, the prize for winning (Zc;t). The
lower wage also has a direct positive e¤ect on the probability of observing
conict, by lowering the opportunity cost of ghting and hence the conict
threshold (ZOc;t). The qualication in the later part of the proposition follows
from the argument right below (12).
While this simple two-sector model is special in having xed coe¢ cients,
the mechanism it describes would hold with the possibility of factor substi-
tution, as long as this is not too great.15 The basic economics behind the
results are clear. Higher prices for exported commodities has a direct e¤ect
on civil war by increasing rents. The e¤ect of higher imported commodity
prices comes from the fact that they reduce the demand for labor in the
importables sector and hence puts downward pressure on the wage.
We have picked this micro-foundation as it ts well with the rest of the
structure of the model that we have developed. However, it is not the only
possibility. For example, Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2006) suggest an alternative
model of how commodity export prices might a¤ect the incidence of conict,
which motivates the empirical work in Dube and Vargas (2008). We could
allow some of the resource rents to be controlled by the opposition, in which
case higher export prices may also lead to higher intensity of conict, as has
been emphasized by e.g., Collier, Hoe­ er and Söderbom (2004).16 When
it comes to import prices, an alternative mechanism that could provide a
link to the incidence of conict would arise if the oppositions willingness to
ght is increasing in their (relative) poverty. In such a grievancemodel of
conict, higher prices of imported commodities, including food, would raise
the probability of conict by cutting real incomes.
Econometric specication We will estimate panel regressions with a bi-
nary civil-war indicator as the dependent variable and with xed country
e¤ects. This is equivalent to considering
Xc(Rc;t  
 
c;c; c; 
O
c

wc;t) EfXc(Rc;t  
 
c;c; c; 
O
c

wc;t)g , (15)
15With subsitution possibilities between land and labor in the export sector, an increase
in the prices of resource exports would also drive up the wage through a higher demand
for labor. Such a Dutch diseasee¤ect would likely dampen, but not eliminate, the e¤ect
on the probability of civil war.
16In terms of our model, we could let parameter , which limits the insurgentscapability
of ghting, depend positively on R.
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i.e., the di¤erence between the conditional and the unconditional probability
of civil war. Proceeding in this way identies the e¤ect of resource rents and
real incomes on the incidence of civil war exclusively from the within-country
variation of these variables, because the impact of their average values and
of the time-invariant parameters in each country will be absorbed by the
country xed e¤ect. This stands in marked contrast to the existing empirical
literature, which typically does not include country xed e¤ects letting the
estimates rely on the cross-country variation in the data.
The heterogeneity in the incidence of conict at di¤erent dates is thus
mainly attributed to time variation in factors that a¤ect wages, wc;t and re-
source rents Rc;t. We can also allow for macro shocks in the global economy
that hit all countries in a common way through year xed e¤ects (time in-
dicator variables), which pick up (in a non-parametric fashion) any general
trends in the prevalence of civil war such as the important trend displayed
in Figure 1a. Thus, the simplest baseline model emerging from (a linear
approximation of) (15) is a linear probability model with:
civc;t = ac + at + byc;t + c;t , (16)
where ac are country xed e¤ects, at are year xed e¤ects. and where yc;t
is a suitably dened vector of time-varying regressors, including export and
import price indexes for primary commodities. Since the crucial parameter is
the share of resource income in total income, we always include GDP in yc;t:
Concerns about potential endogeneity of this variable are addressed below.
To test the auxiliary prediction that yc;t only has an e¤ect for non-inclusive
political institutions (where c < c); we estimate (16) in di¤erent samples
dened by the political institutions in place.
To take account of country-specic variance in the error term, we always
estimate with robust standard errors. While (16) allows for heterogeneity
in a exible way, a remaining econometric concern is that the fraction of
countries in civil war is low, which may bias linear probability estimates. To
diagnose such bias, we also estimate a conditional (xed e¤ects) logit model.
Data We want exploit changes in commodity prices in world markets to
generate exogenous time variation in resource rents and real incomes.17 Using
trade volume data from the NBER-UN Trade data set, and international
17The method that we follow is similar to Deaton and Miller (1996).
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price data for about 45 commodities from UNCTAD, we construct country-
specic export price and import price indexes. Although these go back as
far as 1960, they are the data constraining length of the panel that we study.
The price indexes for a given country have xed weights, computed as the
share of exports and imports of each commodity in the countrys GDP in
a given base year (1980). Given the predictions from two-sector model in
this section, we interpret a higher export price index as a positive shock to
natural resource rents Rc;t, and a higher import price index as a negative
shock to (real) income wc;t.
To get another source of exogenous time variation in income, we use data
on natural disasters from the EM-DAT data set. Specically, we construct
an indicator variable that adds together the number of oods and heat-waves
in a given country and year, assuming that both act as a negative shock to
real incomes.
Empirical results Table 3 gives the results from estimating the linear
probability specication in (16) on our data. In column (1), we run our basic
specication on the whole panel with 124 countries. The estimates show
that income per capita is negatively correlated with civil war incidence, in
conformity with the cross-sectional results of Table 2. In contrast to the cross-
sectional result, being democratic is now negatively to incidence of civil war.
This conrms the di¢ culty of drawing inference from cross-sectional variation
in the presence of considerable cross-country heterogeneity.
Both export and import price indexes for agricultural and mineral prod-
ucts are positively and signicantly correlated with the incidence of civil war.
Moreover, it seems plausible to argue that both of these indexes provide a
source of exogenous variation. The country-specic oil export price does not
explain civil war, while the oil import price is negatively correlated with civil
war.
Stepping outside of the theoretical model, both GDP per capita and
democracy may be determined simultaneously with the incidence of civil war.
It is therefore worth noting that the results on import and export prices are
robust to excluding democracy from the regression. While including a mea-
sure of GDP per capita is important for these results to hold, the results are
robust when we include up to a ten year lag of the level of GDP per capita
suggesting that they are unlikely to be a symptom of reverse causation.
As well as being statistically signicant, the basic results are also quan-
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titatively important. The results in column (1) of Table 2 imply that a one
standard deviation (of the within-country variation) increase in the non-oil
export price index raises the probability of civil war by about 1 percent-
age point. This is a sizeable e¤ect, about 11% of the mean probability of
civil war in the sample (0.087). The non-oil import price e¤ect is larger,
with a one standard-deviation hike mapping into a 15% higher probability
of conict. These are all average e¤ects. However, the fact that we have
constructed country-specic price indexes implies that the e¤ect of any given
price change will be heterogeneous across countries according to the weights
used for constructing the price index. Thus, a change in the world price of a
specic commodity will a¤ect the probability of civil war di¤erently across
countries given common coe¢ cients of the kind that we have estimated.
Our theory also implies a second kind of heterogeneity. Any given change
in resource rents or real incomes will only a¤ect the probability of civil war
when political institutions are non-inclusive (do not protect minorities) i.e.,
when c < c: In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, we therefore split the sam-
ple between parliamentary democracies and non-parliamentary democracies.
The pattern for export and import prices di¤er starkly across these subsam-
ples. Non-oil primary export and import prices are positively correlated with
civil war in the non-parliamentary democracies sample, but negatively corre-
lated in the parliamentary democracies sample. (Also, GDP per capita and
oil import prices are no longer signicantly related to civil war in the latter
group.) This conforms to the prediction in Proposition 7, which gives a key
role to c by determining in which equilibrium we expect a particular country
to be.
Column (4) of Table 3 further disaggregates the export and import prices
into agricultural products and minerals. The data suggest that it is agricul-
tural import and export prices and mineral import prices drive the positive
correlation with civil war. In column (5), we add in the weathershock vari-
able, which is available only for a more restricted sample of countries and
time periods. As expected, more extreme temperatures and more ooding
are positively correlated with the incidence of civil war. In this sample, oil
export prices continue to be statistically insignicant, while oil import prices
now have the expected (positive) sign. For the sake of comparison with the
above results, a one standard deviation increase in non-oil export prices, non-
oil import prices and oil import prices raises the probability of civil war by,
respectively, 14%, 15% and 7%.
Table 4 considers the robustness of this last set of the results to the
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econometric specication and the estimation sample. In column (1), we
report estimates from a conditional (xed e¤ects) logit model. Since this
method e¤ectively drops all countries and years in which there is no civil
war, the sample is more restricted (to the 38 countries that have time-series
variation in the left-hand side variable). These results conrm the ndings
of the model in column (5) of Table 3. That is, primary (non-oil) import and
export prices are positively correlated with the incidence of civil war, as is the
oil-import price index. Within this restricted sample, being democratic has
no explanatory power, whereas a higher GDP per capita remains negatively
correlated with civil war incidence. In column (2) of Table 4, we estimate a
linear probability model on the same sample as the one used in the conditional
logit. This is a useful cross-check that the econometric specication is not
driving the results, as the results in columns (1) and (2) are essentially similar
in economic terms.18 In columns (3) and (4), we repeat the same exercise
on the sample of non-parliamentary democracies that have had a civil war
during our time period. The results are again consistent with those presented
in Table 3.
The results in column (2) of Table 4 can be used to reassess the economic
signicance of the ndings in column (5) of Table 3, given the di¤erent es-
timation method on a smaller sample of countries. Now, a one standard
deviation increase in non-oil export prices, non-oil import prices, and oil
import prices raise the probability of civil war (relative to the mean of the
sub-sample) by, respectively, 20%, 11% and 14%. Note, however, that the
sub-sample mean of conict is as high as 0.28, i.e., more than one country
year out of four is a conict year. Evidently, this sub-group of countries is
generally susceptible to conicts, and particularly so when commodity prices
are on the rise.
Table 5 instead assesses the robustness of the results to alternative mea-
surement. Column (1) uses the UCDP/PRIO civil war incidence measure.
Again, the results are quite similar even though the commodity import price
index is no longer signicant.
Column (2) looks at the onset of civil war, which has been extensively
18As a further check, note that the size of the coe¢ cients in columns (1) and (2) are quite
similar when adjusted appropriately, i.e. by multiplying the logit estimates by p^ (1  p^)
where p^ is the average predicted probability. Since p^ is on the order of 0.3, this means that
the co¢ cients in column (1) should be multiplied by about 0.2 to make them comparable
to those in column (2).
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studied in the earlier literature.19 The various ambiguities and di¢ culties in
the coding of civil wars are also likely to imply considerably more measure-
ment error for the onset than for the duration of any multi-year conict (see
Sambanis, 2004). Our theoretical model also does not give a specic predic-
tion for onset apart from incidence this would require having some explicit
source of state dependence in the model. The results in column (2) suggest
that our empirical model o¤ers little explanatory power for war onset. This
suggests that our time varying regressors are doing a better job at picking
out periods with conditions for a civil war to be sustained over time, rather
than conditions which are relevant only in periods when a civil war begins.
In column (3), we consider a more continuous measure of conict battle
deaths. Again, the basic results from Table 3 remain robust: export and
import prices are positively correlated with battle deaths. In columns (4) and
(5), we assess the robustness of the results to splitting the sample according
to whether the country has weak or strong executive constraints. In line with
our ndings in Table 3, it is only countries with weak executive constraints
where civil war incidence is higher in the wake of higher non-oil primary
export and import prices.
6 Concluding Comments
We have put forward a theoretical model to analyze the incidence of civil war.
We have used this to interpret the data and to identify factors that a¤ect the
time-series and cross-sectional patterns of conict. Our main empirical inno-
vation has been to show that increases in the prices of exported and imported
primary commodities have statistically and quantitatively signicant positive
e¤ects on the incidence of civil conict. The fact that we control for xed
country and year e¤ects gets around one of the key worries in the literature,
namely that unobserved characteristics of institutions, culture and economic
structure are the primary drivers of civil war. Motivated by the theory, we
have also shown that the e¤ects of world-market prices are heterogeneous,
depending on whether or not a country is a parliamentary democracy, or has
a system of strong checks and balances, which we interpret as proxies for a
key model parameter reecting how consensual are political institutions.
The ndings in this paper resonate with prior contributions emphasiz-
ing the role of institutions, economic development and natural resources in
19See, for example, Fearon and Laitin (2003).
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a¤ecting conict. Much work remains, however, to complete our agenda
geared towards interpreting empirical results on conict through the lens of
theoretical models. One helpful, but limiting, feature of the current model
is the symmetry between incumbent and opposition groups. The model can
be extended to incorporate income inequality so that wage rates are het-
erogenous. It can also be extended so that groups vary their weighting of
national interests (national public goods) and private interests (transfers).
Preliminary investigations in this direction suggest that the impact of such
heterogeneity on conict turns out to be subtle and less clear-cut than is
often claimed based on intuitive reasoning.
Our empirical analysis has only supercially engaged with the distinction
between onset and duration of civil war. To make further progress based on
an underlying theoretical structure would require introducing an underlying
source of state dependence so that the model is genuinely dynamic. This
could be achieved by introducing group heterogeneity. The state variable
would then be the group in power making the equilibrium in any given pe-
riod state-dependent. This would lead naturally towards an empirical model
where civil war incidence and political turnover are jointly determined.
Richer dynamics could also be introduced by expanding the model to
include stocks of public and private capital. This would allow the joint
evolution of conict and economic development to be studied. A preliminary
step in this direction is taken in Besley and Persson (2008b) which develops
a model related to this one to analyze how state capacities evolve in response
to the prospect of conict. That paper shows how incentives to invest in
institutions for raising tax revenues and supporting private markets may
boost productivity. It would also be interesting to study how civil conict
shapes private incentives to invest in physical and human capital. It is clear,
therefore, that much remains to be done to integrate the study of civil war
with the study of economic growth.
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7 Proof of Lemma 2
To solve for the sun-game perfect equilibrium, we begin by deriving the
reaction function of the incumbent to some xed level of LO. Maximizing
(6), the rst-order condition for the choice of LI is
  1       LO; LI (1  2)w + (1  2) Z   wLI  0.
Solving for an interior solution, we obtain:
wLI =
1
2

LO
w

+ Z   ZI

: (17)
Thus LI is strictly positive for all Z > ZI LO w

, making Z < ZI a necessary
condition for LI = 0: Below, we will show that this is also su¢ cient.
Now consider the rst-order condition to (7) for the oppositions choice
of army, assuming that LI > 0. This is given by:
 w + 

1   @L
I
@LO

(1  2) 2[Z   wLI ]
 2w[ +   LO; LI (1  2)] @LI
@LO
 0 :
We can solve this, using Assumption 1(a) and observing that @L
I
@LO
= 1
2
; to
obtain:
 w + (1  2)Z   wL
O

  w + 
O (1  2)

 0 : (18)
We now prove the result. By the denition of ZO; a su¢ cient condition
for LO > 0 is Z  ZO. Observe also that since ZO > ZI , LO = 0 for Z < ZI ;
which makes Z < ZI necessary and su¢ cient for a peaceful equilibrium.
Hence for Z 2 ZI ; ZO we have LI > 0 with the level in part 2 of the
Lemma given from (17). Finally, for Z > ZO; we nd that:
LOw

= Z   ZO , (19)
where ZO is dened in (9) as long as LO < , so the opposition is not
constrained by its revenue raising capacity. Plugging (19) into (17) gives
wLI as stated in the Lemma. 
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